3 pollsters in Czechoslovakia operated with a fair degree of autonomy from the state, and their (predominantly governmental) sponsors.
There was little governmental intervention in, or censure of UVVM's polling activities, and the polling institute was relatively free to conduct research into any area of politics, economics, society or culture.
Furthermore the data was publicly available in the monthly journal Verejne Mineni (Public Opinion). In its first year, UVVM conducted polls which were designed to help the reconstruction of political structures and apparatus after the period of repression, and the suspension of democracy which had characterized German occupation between 1939
and 1945. The public was asked to consider the most effective methods for reorganizing the administrative mechanisms at local, district and provincial level and their reactions to plans for curbing the influence of the traditional state structures, and of broadening the powers of elected representatives in the newly established National Committees.
Furthermore, the polls sought to identify which further reforms could be implemented to democratize the political system. The leaders of the Czechoslovak resistance movement had agreed upon a joint Government Programme at Kosice during the final phase of the country's liberation, which formalized the political structure of the new state, and guaranteed representation in government of all political parties. This programme for political reconstruction was accompanied by the Two Year Plan, a blue-print for economic rehabilitation. The polls monitored the public's awareness of, and reactions to these programmes, together with their perception of the government's performance, and the popularity of ministers and party leaders. 6 UVVM also conducted a pre-election poll for the May 1946 general election.
During this period, there was 'limited' political pluralism -before the German invasion,
there were approximately thirty political parties in Czechoslovakia, but after the war, there were only eight (four in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, and four in Slovakia). The 4 union of five of these parties formed the National Front, a grand coalition government with no legitimate opposition. At the election, the Communist Party secured 40% of the votes and 114 of the 300 seats. With the support of the Social Democrats, they mustered a majority in Parliament, and were invited by President Benes to form a government.
The performance of UVVM in accurately forecasting the outcome of the election to within 1.1% of the final results was an indication to the public and to policy-makers alike, of the ability, effectiveness and validity of polls in measuring public. The success of UVVM at the election led to a proliferation of political opinion polling by the institute.
In February 1948, the coalition government was replaced by a government composed of members of the Communist Party and its supporters from other parties.
Elections were then proposed for May of that year, and Gottwald pronounced that the Party would secure the largest share of votes, and that this would signal majority support for their plans to revolutionize Czechoslovakian life. UVVM organized three pre-election polls to test the levels of support for the parties, and to forecast the likely outcome of the election. However, after the questionnaires from the first wave of the survey were collected, they were confiscated by government officials. Nonetheless, they had already been processed by hand, and a visiting American journalist learned that the results suggested that the Communist Party would gain only about 30% of the votes cast at the forthcoming election, much less than the 40% achieved at the election in 1946. 7 Such a finding might have had a damaging effect on the Communist Party, calling into question their claims to represent the mass of the populace, and undermining their ambitions for constructing a new state and society based on the Stalinist-model which had developed in the Soviet Union. The view held by the new communist-led government of polling was one of suspicion: the prospect of an independent opinion polling institution, publishing findings which ran contrary to the propaganda of the Party, and which denied 5 the alleged consensus of public support for the values and aims of Marxism-Leninism, was perceived by the party leadership as intolerable. 8 Furthermore, the polling methodologies had been imported by Adamec and Viden from the USA, when they visited Albert Cantrill and George Gallup shortly after the war. The methodologies they used when they returned were a direct reflection of those employed by the pollsters in capitalist countries. Samples were generated using a quota method (based on gender, age, social class, community size and geographical distribution); personal interviews were conducted with structured questionnaires. 9 In a period of mutual suspicion between the Western capitalist bloc, and the new communist-led countries, it was perhaps not surprising that the authorities were critical of opinion polling activities.
As a consequence, the period after the ascendance to political power of the Communist Party in February 1948, was one of repression for opinion polling in Czechoslovakia. UVVM was permitted to continue its activities for a further two years but only after it had been reorganized, and only in the context of enquiring into nonpolitical issues. The chief editor of Verejne Mineni was forced to leave the building immediately the Communist Party had assumed control of the government, and the journal was closed down. The institute's entire personnel, none of them members of the Communist Party, were sacked; one founder-member, Cenek Adamec, was imprisoned, and later forced to work in a factory. The combination of these events led ultimately to the gradual disappearance of Czechoslovakian opinion polling. 10 In fact, public opinion research was also largely perceived as an irrelevant activity within the communist-led countries. In the Soviet Union for instance, under Stalin's leadership, "...the instruments by which public opinion was discovered included the secret police, the party apparatus...letters to the mass media, and 'self-criticism'". 11 Worcester observes that, between '...1930 and the mid-1950s, the Soviet leadership 6 tended to assume that party cadres, aided by KGB sources and informants, knew what needed to be known about the citizenry's needs, attitudes and preferences'. 12 Furthermore, independent opinion polls which were geared towards reporting the publics' rating of the performance of the Party, and of the Party leaderships, and which sought to measure satisfaction levels with policy proposals and outcomes, were viewed by the party hierarchies as unnecessary. Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, former Central
Committee member of the Polish Communist Party, and chief political (and polling)
advisor to General Jaruzelski claims that:
'The picture of a differentiated society that emerged from the public opinion research did not fit the thesis on the moral and political unity of the nation obligatory at that time'. 13 Communist governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe took a rather dim view of Social Science generally, and of social research methods and opinion polling. As a leading Polish opinion pollster during the communist reign in Poland during the 1980s,
Piotr Kwiatkowski notes:
"During the Stalinist period, every attempt to express independent opinion on social or political issues was brutally suppressed. The notion of public opinion was officially condemned and sociology was banned from the universities of all communist countries as a Western 'pseudo-science'".
14 However, a large number of Central and East European countries had strong, established traditions in sociology that pre-dated the communist era. In Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Russia, Czechoslovakia and Romania, sociology emerged in the latter half of the 1800s as a social protest, rather than a purely academic discipline -indeed the 7 absence of any official Hungarian sociology at this time has been ascribed to its association by governments with political radicalism and with socialist-inspired antiestablishment protests. Many early prominent sociologists in the region then were progressive, often socialist activists, who '...combined their sociological studies with an active engagement in various struggles for social justice, democratic freedom and national independence'. 15 After the victory of the October revolution in 1917, sociology in the USSR become concerned with the study of the emerging socialist society and consequently, it was officially perceived as a method for understanding and contributing to the human condition; this was considered as serving a more useful purpose than the objectives of those who held a more traditional, humanistic view of sociology as the accumulation of knowledge for knowledge's sake. In this latter context, objective, empirical sociological research was seen as alienated from the problems of human society by communist leaderships, and was irrelevant in the struggle for constructing an international socialist community.
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With the political ascendancy of the Stalinist bureaucracies, sociological research, with the exception of the official Marxist-Leninist approach, was virtually nonexistent up until the end of the 1950s. Empirical-quantitative studies of society and politics were criticized because they were identified with a broadly Western, chiefly
American orientation to the study of society. Attila notes that, as a consequence:
'Political science did not simply disappear after a small period of emergence and early successes in democratization (1944-48) but it was banned as a pseudo-science of the bourgeoisie -an autocratic rule does not need the science of Democracy'. 17 The suppression of sociology then, in the period up until the end of the 1950s in Central and East European communist political systems was a function of the political 8 leaderships' view of it as 'bourgeois politology', and 'reactionary political science', and as a threat to communist hegemony. 18 In the light of these discussions, it is not surprising that the early communist regimes demonstrated little enthusiasm for opinion polling. However, there is some evidence of polling taking place in communist-led societies, although these polling institutes were usually set up, financed, controlled, and accountable to the ruling Party. Research, and its polling branch, the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion was closed.
19 However, during the 1980s, the communist leaderships in the Soviet Union gradually warmed to the idea of conducting and publishing opinion polls, although early studies were limited in scope of issues covered: in 1983, the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov announced that a national institute of public opinion would be formed to cover the entire USSR. 20 Slider observes that the rationale was based upon the experiences of a public opinion centre created by the Georgian Communist Party. There, the reform-minded Shevardnadze frequently cited polls as an aid to policy-making and agenda-setting. 21 As a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika' programmes, such centres were actually established the following year. 22 The development of these polling centres is explained by Valery Korobeinikov in terms of the role that they could take for the government in initiating and extending the processes of political democratization. In the first instance, he observes that the spirit of public opinion research was written into the Soviet constitution of 1977, which stated that the extension of socialist democracy is closely connected with '...greater openness and publicity, and constant responsiveness to public opinion'. 23 Secondly in a more concrete sense, polls assisted politicians by identifying public attitudes to reform; they provided feedback from citizens in relation to government plans, and therefore assisted policy-formulation and implementation. On political reform, public opinion polls were conducted to help clarify voters' attitudes to innovations in the electoral system (particularly the secret ballot) and the nomination of 10 party candidates. 24 Sample sizes were not sufficient to account for the population diversity, and extreme regional variation undermined the efficacy of polls in providing typical national pictures of public opinion. Furthermore, certain groups were over-represented -including ethnic Russians, urban respondents, and those in the larger settlements -which inevitably reinforced the sample bias. Data was usually aggregated, so that differences in response across key variables such as gender, age, nationality and social group could not be identified, and temporal comparisons were unachievable because of the lack of questionwording consistency across polls. 27 This raises a key issue when describing the development of polling in communist societies: methodological limitations of polling organizations in seeking to measure public opinion. This is discussed below in relation to Polish polling experiences, which raises general issues which can be applied to other communist contexts.
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Methods and Issues In Polling Communist Political Systems
Political opinion polls conducted in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had their methodological origins in the USA and Western Europe. 28 Prior to the Second World War, most sociological research was qualitative-based 29 
The Interview Situation and Non-response
It is possible to differentiate two official models of the interview situation and the role of the respondent, which pertain in capitalist and in communist societies. 31 The first model assumes that in countries like America and Britain, the respondent is strongly Poland under conditions of communist rule. They maintain that the public closely associated '...sociology, and social and political research with the state, its institutions, and the system of political power'. 33 Social surveys and political opinion polls were perceived to be linked to governments' propaganda strategies -part of a process whereby public opinion data was collected, and then manipulated and reported in such a way as to disseminate information publicly purporting to demonstrate universal support for the government, and the principles and programme of Marxism-Leninism. 34 There was little sense that polls could help either to facilitate beneficial changes within society and for individuals generally, or that such data was taken into account in formulating and implementing policies. Such polls were therefore observed with a large degree of ambivalence and scepticism by the public. 35 A common view identified amongst the public was that polling research was state-sponsored in order to monitor citizens' loyalty to the government, and control their consciousness. As such, many people were reported by IFiS to be afraid of revealing any opinions which might in some way incriminate them, or lead to retribution from the state.
The granting of an interview often requires therefore a suppression of fear and apprehension. On the basis of these findings, it is surprising then that people took part in opinion polls at all in communist political systems. Indeed, Lutynska reports that at the end of the 1970s, the refusal rate in surveys conducted by OBOP in Poland was only about 12%. 36 This apparent contradiction is explained in terms of two major factors. 13 Firstly, respondents' behaviour is governed by a traditional, and deeply internalized cultural norm requiring them to be hospitable to people, including strangers. This accounts both for people inviting interviewers into their homes, and for volunteering to take part in political surveys. Secondly, the interviewer is usually treated as a representative of a state agency, which forms part of the dominant power system. It is thus possible that '...fear of running into troubles or of being called to account for a refusal of interview dominates over the feeling of apprehension resulting from participation in the interview'. Refusal rates were often recorded between 40% and 50% during this period, and these varied according to socio-economic and demographic status, and between regions and cities. Ultimately, sample-surveys were often biased under Martial Law conditions. A number of factors have been identified which help to explain both these low levels of response, and of response variation. Lutynska claims that sponsorship of the research tended to make a significant impact here. The highest rate of refusals occurred in polls 14 conducted by state-controlled organizations (OBP 28-50%, CBOS 23-44%, OBOP 16-28), whilst in academic surveys non-response ranged between only 3% and 4%.
Furthermore, the name of the research centre may also influence respondents'
willingness to take part in such research. A common problem for the Centre for Press
Research (OBP) was that they were associated with newspapers which had a low credibility rating amongst large sections of the public: '...people do not want to speak with representatives of the press, since they fear that their answers will be twisted, passed on to non-academic centres, or may be used for propaganda purposes contrary with their own beliefs'. 40 The subject of the research also played a significant role in reducing the levels of public participation in polls -especially politically sensitive topics. When combined with the effects of other factors such as sponsor of the poll, political context in which it was conducted, and generalized public concern for lack of anonymity in such surveys, this was seen as a major impediment to the achievement of representative polls.
Finally, interviews were often associated with government officials, the police and security services, and activists of the ruling Communist Party (the PUWP); in the context of Martial Law, the fear of retribution from the state for criticizing the authorities and the principles of Marxism-Leninism in polls was greater than in other periods of communist rule. 41 
The Incidence of 'Don't Know' Responses
During the Martial Law period, respondents in opinion polls were likely to exercise some discretion in answering questions on politically sensitive topics by registering 'don't know' responses where they felt that the expression of their views might lead to some punitive action by the authorities. The use of such replies was therefore a means through which people could disguise their non-response in polls. 15 Lutynska's research has found that during the period 1980-1985, the number of such replies trebled for questions which were 'easy but sensitive'; she claims that question sensitivity was a more important factor than question complexity, or lack of knowledge about the issue polled. 42 Kwiatkowski reports that the incidence of such responses were variable, particularly marked in terms of educational level, and influenced by the 'sponsorship' factor: respondents were more likely to answer 'don't know' to politicallysensitive questions polled by the state-controlled institute CBOS, than by the academic IFiS. 43 This suggests that the reliability of many political opinion polls -particularly those conducted by state-owned and controlled agencies -and the validity of the data collected was extremely limited in communist political systems.
The Presence of Third Persons in Interviews
Research at IFiS has also revealed that the presence or absence in the course of an opinion poll interview of third parties will have a major impact on the reliability of the data collected. This will be further complicated by the context in which the interview is conducted. 44 In the first instance, Lutynska reports that in a series of surveyexperiments between 1966 and 1968, the percentage of interviews in which third persons took part ranged between 27.4% and 63.7%, depending on the research topic; the average rate was 46.1%. This factor was accountable for a difference in respondents' expressed answers by up to a margin of 20.1%. Furthermore, such situations tended to vary according to various social and spatial milieus, which suggests that the results obtained in any such research were likely to be skewed. Third persons were also likely to participate as 'active respondents', rather than passive listeners in the polls:
16 '...the respondents may be reminded of certain facts or prompted, the strangers may present their views and opinions on the subject in question, they may make remarks referring to the questions, the interviews or the respondent, they may even begin discussions and quarrels in connection with some of the problems taken up in the interview'. 45 This poses the question of how to interpret the findings: whose opinions are the subject of research -the individual, or the group? Jan Lutynska observes that in later studies conducted by IFiS in the 1970s, researchers found that different answers were given by respondents according to the location of interviews. Lutynska concludes that in general, a home atmosphere was more conducive to the expression of private opinions (especially on political issues) whereas in a work environment, participants were likely to concur with what they perceived were the 'official' positions on these topics.
Summary
This paper has demonstrated that the main methodological issues confronting the opinion pollsters in communist political systems were directly related to the political atmosphere which pertained there. Essentially, respondents' refusals to participate in polls were manifest in terms both of avoiding taking part in polling interviews, and by answering 'Don't Know' at strategic points within the interview. Generally, respondents attached a low value to the efficacy of political opinion polls, and the motivation to take part, especially in periods where traditionalist-Marxist-Leninists were dominant within the key political institutions of the state, was low. This lack of public co-operation in polls was summarized by Lutynska:
17 "...they are afraid, do not believe in the anonymity of the survey, believe that this is a 'waste of time', 'makes no sense', will change nothing', 'is of use of nobody'... [or] would be doctored-up and used for propaganda purposes". 46 Furthermore, the absence of political tolerance, and rights of free expression inclined many respondents to avoid making public utterances on the political set-up, government leadership, and current affairs, for fear of retribution by the state. Instead, where citizens felt compelled to take part in political surveys, they were likely to disguise their real opinions if they feel that these did not correspond with the official issue-positions as reported in the mass media, or else stated that they did not have an opinion. This was particularly likely in polling institutions associated with the state. Response rates were also variable. Consequently those who did participate in polls were unlikely to be representative of the full population, and the polls themselves to be unreliable indicators of the state of public opinion.
